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In 2017, Alec Smith, a Type 1 diabetic, aged out of his mother’s 
health insurance plan when he turned twenty-six.1 He was dead a 
month later, likely because he was attempting to ration his insulin until 
he could afford to buy more at his next payday.2 Alex had a job as a 
restaurant manager, but even with his salary of $35,000, he still could 
not afford his insulin, which would have cost him $1,300 per month.3 
Unfortunately, his salary was too high to qualify for Medicaid 
assistance or other similar subsidies, but too low to be able to afford 
health insurance without a prohibitively high deductible.4 Not all 
stories involving high insulin prices involve deadly consequences, but 
the impacts can be severe. Laura Marston, a thirty-six-year-old woman 
with Type 1 diabetes, lost her job at a law firm.5 Without health 
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 1.  Bram Sable-Smith, Insulin’s High Cost Leads to Lethal Rationing, NPR (Sept. 1, 2018, 
8:35 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/09/01/641615877/insulins-high-cost-
leads-to-lethal-rationing.  
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Ritu Prasad, The Human Cost of Insulin in America, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2019), 
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insurance, she was spending $2,880 per month on insulin.6 In order to 
move to Washington, D.C. to find a new job to afford her insulin, she 
had to sell most of her possessions and give up her dog.7 
These stories are not uncommon for diabetics in the United States 
who need to buy insulin monthly to survive. Insulin controls blood 
sugar levels, and an insulin imbalance can have deadly consequences. 
The discoverers of insulin recognized the importance of the hormone 
and its life-saving potential, selling the patent for one dollar in 1923 so 
everyone could benefit from it.8 But their vision for the drug has not 
materialized; instead, insulin costs an average of $300 per vial.9 
The federal government has recognized that changes in market 
prices for drugs can have dire consequences. Insulin is not the only drug 
with prohibitive prices in recent years.10 Unlike other patented 
products, when drug prices skyrocket—due to the monopoly power of 
patents or otherwise—people may die. While advocating for various 
solutions, both the Biden and Trump administrations have recognized 
the importance of halting the rise of prescription drug prices.11 Most of 
the solutions advanced are focused on government-side initiatives, such 
as allowing Medicare to directly negotiate with pharmaceutical 
companies.12 Yet, the march-in rights built into the Bayh-Dole Act13 
create an opportunity to set up a mechanism that would invite private 




 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-281, PRESCRIPTION 
DRUGS: U.S. PRICES FOR SELECTED BRAND DRUGS WERE HIGHER ON AVERAGE THAN PRICES 
IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND FRANCE (2021). 
 11.  See American Patients First: The Trump Administration Blueprint to Lower Drug Prices 
and Reduce Out-of-Pocket Costs, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., 3 (May 2018), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/AmericanPatientsFirst.pdf (“One of my greatest priorities 
is to reduce the price of prescription drugs.”) [hereinafter Trump Administration Blueprint]; 
Healthcare, BIDEN HARRIS DEMOCRATS, https://joebiden.com/healthcare/ (last visited May 7, 
2021) (listing multiple reforms to reduce the power of drug companies to abusively price drugs) 
[hereinafter Biden Harris Reforms]. 
 12.  See Trump Administration Blueprint, supra note 11, at 10 (proposing Medicare reform 
to give plan sponsors the ability to negotiate with manufacturers); Biden Harris Reforms, supra 
note 11 (proposing ending regulations that permit drug corporations to avoid negotiating with 
government healthcare plans). 
 13.  Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. §§ 200–211). 
 14.  35 U.S.C. § 203 (2018) (giving the government the ability to require the licensee who 
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The United States has a penchant for private litigation.15 Unlike 
Europe, which largely regulates ex ante through centralized 
bureaucracies, the United States tends to rely on ex post law 
enforcement through private litigation.16 Although private 
enforcement can be ad hoc and uneven, it provides an avenue for 
redress when regulation has failed and gives the party with the 
informational advantage control over litigation.17 The United States 
has tried to create a robust system of ex ante regulation in the form of 
the Food and Drug Administration, but there are several regimes of 
private enforcement that work to capture inefficiencies in the health 
industry. 
As described in detail in this Note, Congress has invited private 
parties into the courts to regulate various aspects of the healthcare 
industry through Paragraph IV litigation from the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
qui tam litigation aimed at Medicare and Medicaid fraud, and antitrust 
litigation. Taken together, these private enforcement mechanisms work 
to moderate drug prices, reduce fraud in healthcare billing, and ensure 
a healthy, competitive pharmaceutical market. Although each of these 
mechanisms has weaknesses, they operate to regulate a field where 
blanket regulation from a federal agency may not be workable or 
efficient. In doing so, the interests of private parties are brought closer 
to that of the government, effectively harnessing “selfish” private 
actors for the public good. 
A similar mechanism of private enforcement should be 
implemented to control the prohibitive drug pricing in the United 
States. The Bayh-Dole Act includes a provision that reserves march-in 
rights to federal agencies if the companies that obtain patents funded 
by federal research do not meet certain criteria.18 Although these 
march-in rights have never been exercised,19 they provide an already 
existing statutory mechanism to control runaway drug prices. One of 
the weaknesses of the current march-in rights is uncertainty over the 
 
acquired title under the Act to grant a license to a “responsible applicant,” and if refused, to grant 
the license itself based upon a specified set of criteria). 
 15.  See 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *161 (noting that the “common informer” 
advances the public interest). 
 16.  Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2012). 
 17.  Id. at 1155–56. 
 18.  35 U.S.C. § 203. 
 19.  JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44597, MARCH-IN RIGHTS UNDER THE 
BAYH-DOLE ACT 8 (2016). 
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criteria for exercising them.20 Congress should amend the Bayh-Dole 
Act to clarify the criteria for the march-in rights by listing factors to 
define when drug prices are unreasonable or unconscionable. Congress 
should additionally let qui tam relators bring suits to obtain licenses to 
manufacture and sell drugs at a lower price should a court find the 
newly set-out criteria have been violated. 
By allowing a private party to initiate and carry out the litigation, 
the private interests of the qui tam relator can be brought into 
alignment with the public good. When a manufacturer has a monopoly 
on a brand name drug, other companies have an interest in breaking 
that monopoly and obtaining some of the market by offering the drug 
at a lower price. Offering the lower-priced alternative also serves the 
public good. Furthermore, downstream effects triggered by the 
initiation of the march-in rights litigation would cause companies to 
consider the factors laid out in the legislation when setting drug prices 
in the future. Eventually, drug prices could drop to more reasonable 
levels to avoid unnecessary and potentially costly litigation. 
Part I of this Note explores recent drug price increases and offers 
some of the reasons behind them. Part II will provide a history of 
private enforcement in the United States, as well as a closer look at the 
three private enforcement mechanisms that create a system of ex post 
regulation for the healthcare industry. Part III will summarize the 
history and congressional intent behind the Bayh-Dole Act. Part IV will 
lay out the proposed private enforcement mechanisms in relation to the 
Bayh-Dole Act march-in rights, taking into account the failures and 
weaknesses of the current private enforcement mechanisms. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. HEALTHCARE PRICING 
The United States healthcare system is one of the most expensive 
in the world. In 2009, the U.S. spent a total of $2.47 trillion on health 
expenditures.21 Prescription drugs specifically are the fastest growing 
portion of national health expenditures, increasing “from 5.8 percent in 
1993 to 10.7 percent in 2003.”22 The increasing prices of brand name 
 
 20.  See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., SPECIAL PUB. NO. 
1234, RETURN ON INVESTMENT INITIATIVE TO ADVANCE THE PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT 
AGENDA: FINAL GREEN PAPER 32 (2019), 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.1234.pdf (finding stakeholder 
uncertainty as to the scope of march-in rights leads to market uncertainty).  
 21.  D. Christopher Ohly & Sailesh K. Patel, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Prescriptions for 
Innovative and Inexpensive Medicines, 19 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 107, 121 (2011). 
 22.  Id. 
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drugs, more so than generics, drain the bank accounts of everyday 
Americans, as generic drugs cost on average about half that of brand 
name drugs.23 While brand name drug prices increased by 28.9 percent 
in a five-year period, generic drug prices only increased, on average, by 
9.4 percent during that time.24 
Brand name drugs have rapidly increased in price, and inflation 
cannot fully explain the pace. A report found that the list prices of 600 
brand name drugs rose by a median of 21.4 percent between January 
2018 and June 2020.25 Another study found that from 2005 to 2017, the 
318 most widely used drug products in the AARP combined market 
basket increased in price by 203.4 percent.26 Although inflation may be 
the cause for some of the price increases, many drug price increases 
outpaced inflation from 2006 to 2017.27 Between July 2018 and July 
2019, 50 percent of drugs covered by Medicare Part D had price 
increases that outpaced inflation.28 Furthermore, for the drugs 
accounting for the most Part D spending in 2019, twenty-two of the 
twenty-five drugs had prices that increased faster than inflation, 
between a 3 percent and 19.7 percent increase compared with an 
inflation rate of 1.8 percent.29 
Chairman Elijah Cummings of the House Oversight Committee 
launched an investigation into the high costs of prescription 
medication, which resulted in a series of reports in late 2020 focusing 
on a few drugs with astronomical prices.30 The reports collectively paint 
 
 23.  Id. at 122. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM, 116TH CONG., DRUG PRICING 
INVESTIGATION: CELGENE AND BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB—REVLIMID 38 (2020), 
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/Celgene%20BMS%20Staff
%20Report%2009-30-2020.pdf (citing STATE OF CALIFORNIA, OFFICE OF STATEWIDE HEALTH 
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, Prescription Drug Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC) Increases 
(Aug. 17, 2020), oshpd.ca.gov/visualizations/prescriptiondrug-wholesale-acquisition-cost-
increases/). 
 26.  Stephen W. Schondelmeyer & Leigh Purvis, Trends in Retail Prices of Prescription 
Drugs Widely Used by Older Americans: 2017 Year-End Update, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., 7 
(Sept. 2019), https://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/ppi/2019/09/trends-in-retail-prices-of-
prescription-drugs-widely-used-by-older-americans.doi.10.26419-2Fppi.00073.003.pdf. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Juliette Cubanski & Tricia Neuman, Price Increases Continue to Outpace Inflation for 
Many Medicare Part D Drugs, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Feb. 4, 2021), 
https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/price-increases-continue-to-outpace-inflation-for-
many-medicare-part-d-drugs/. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Investigation of Skyrocketing Prescription Drug Prices, HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT 
AND REFORM, https://oversight.house.gov/investigations/investigation-of-skyrocketing-
prescription-drug-prices (last visited May 7, 2021), reports can be found at 
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a picture of aggressive revenue targets, manipulation of patents to 
extend exclusivity, and an overly burdened United States healthcare 
system that is forced to pay prices far above those in Europe. Whenever 
a company raises drug prices, the result is deadweight loss—people who 
could afford the fair market price of the drug are priced out.31 This 
deadweight loss arises because companies have monopolies over 
patented drugs, barring substitutes from the market.32 Yet, with drug 
monopolies, pricing out could mean that someone cannot afford life-
saving medication.33 Unfortunately, deadweight loss in healthcare 
means dead people. 
The unusual demand curve for prescription drugs lets companies 
increase drug prices without losing customers. Unlike normal economic 
pricing, under which demand for a new product falls after a prolonged 
period of time—and the price for the product will likely drop even with 
a monopoly—prescription drugs have an almost unlimited demand 
curve.34 Drug companies take advantage of this unlimited curve by 
implementing drug price increases that far outstrip inflation.35 
Furthermore, research and development (R&D) costs of the drugs 
cannot account for the astronomical price increases.36 Instead, drug 
companies increase prices on a whim—as Celgene’s former Senior Vice 
President quipped “anytime they want[]”37—and in response to 
aggressive revenue targets set by executives.38 Doing so allows drug 
companies to lean on the United States healthcare system to pick up 
slack from the European healthcare system,39 where drug prices are 
generally tightly controlled.40 
Patents confer a set period of market exclusivity for drugs, but 
 
https://oversight.house.gov/news/reports. 
 31.  See Hannah Brennan et al., A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging 
Government Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 275, 293–98 (2016) (explaining the 
effects of deadweight loss in the pharmaceutical industry). 
 32.  Id. at 294. 
 33.  See id. at 297 (describing the loss in human welfare from high drug prices). 
 34.  Id. at 295. 
 35.  See Cubanksi & Neuman, supra note 28 (describing price increases relative to inflation 
rates for Medicare Part D drugs). 
 36.  See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM, 116TH CONG., DRUG PRICING 
INVESTIGATION CELGENE AND BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB—REVLIMID ii (2020) (noting how cost 
decisions of Revlimid did not correspond with research and development on the drug). 
 37.  Id. at 4. 
 38.  Id. at 7. 
 39.  See id. at 12 (showing the price of Revlimid remained steady in the European Union 
while increasing in price in the United States). 
 40.  See generally Christine Leopold et al., Differences in External Price Referencing in 
Europe – A Descriptive Overview, 104 HEALTH POL’Y 50 (2012). 
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companies exploit gray areas in the law to both extend that exclusivity 
farther than they may otherwise receive and ensure their higher-priced 
brand name drug is still prescribed even when lacking market 
exclusivity. Drug companies tend to layer patents on top of their 
prescription drugs in order to extend market exclusivity, a process 
known colloquially as “evergreening.”41 The danger of this practice is 
that drug companies may extend their market exclusivity for a drug far 
beyond the twenty-year period usually attached to a patent, giving 
them the opportunity to raise their drug prices uninhibited for longer.42 
Drug companies also attempt to stop generic companies from entering 
the market at the end of the exclusivity period by using the restrictions 
surrounding the Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies to prevent 
generics from getting samples of brand name drugs to reverse 
engineer.43 
Even once drug companies have lost their market exclusivities, they 
engage in practices to keep prices high—such as lobbying doctors to 
prescribe brand name drugs and contracting with health plans and 
pharmacy benefit managers.44 These companies also often market a 
new drug dosage combined with increasing the price of the old dosage 
to force patients back onto the patent-protected drug.45 In 
acknowledgement of the high drug prices, pharmaceutical companies 
also pay into funds that provide co-pay assistance to patients, 
leveraging brand name loyalty to ensure patients will ask to be 
prescribed their favorite brands even with the prohibitive costs.46 
The government is not blind to these issues, and rules and 
legislation have been proposed to address the issue.47 The Trump 
 
 41.  C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective 
Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 327–328 (Mar. 2012). 
 42.  See id. at 328 (describing how companies use the patent system to prevent generic drugs 
from entering the market).  
 43.  NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS. ENG’G MED., MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE: A 
NATIONAL IMPERATIVE, 40 (Norman R. Augustine et al., eds., 2018). 
 44.  STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM, 116TH CONG., DRUG PRICING 
INVESTIGATION NOVARTIS—GLEEVEC ii (2020). 
 45.  STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM, 116TH CONG., DRUG PRICING 
INVESTIGATION TEVA—COPAXONE iv (2020). 
 46.  Id. at ii–iii. 
 47.  Unfortunately, the transition to the Biden administration seems to have slowed, and 
maybe even reversed, the initiatives supported by Trump. See Merle DeLancey, Jr., Biden 
Administration Already Impacting Drug Prices, JDSUPRA (Feb. 17, 2021), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/biden-administration-already-impacting-2691434/ (outlining 
the Biden administration’s response to Trump’s executive orders and regulations related to drug 
pricing). 
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administration pushed several rules designed to lower Medicare 
spending on prescriptions drugs.48 One interim rule issued in November 
2020 implemented the Most Favored Nation (MFN) model for 
Medicare Part B spending, which sets Medicare reimbursement at the 
lowest price paid by member countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).49 Another rule 
would have eliminated rebates between drug manufacturers and 
pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) and allowed drug companies to 
give discounts to patients directly.50 Finally, the Trump administration 
issued a rule that created ways to import drugs from other countries.51 
The innovation did not stop with the Trump administration. 
The Biden administration recently supported a proposal to cap 
drug price increases at the rate of inflation.52 Any price increase that 
outstrips inflation would require the drug manufacturer to pay a rebate 
to the federal government.53 The bill also would set up Medicare drug 
price negotiation, wherein the federal government could leverage its 
purchasing power to negotiate lower prices for Medicare Part D.54 The 
CBO estimates that this proposal could save around $450 billion over 
a period of 9 years.55 The proposal was included in H.R.3, which was 
passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate Finance 
Committee in the 116th Congress.56 In the Republican-controlled 
Senate, however, the bill was not brought up for a floor vote.57 In the 
117th Congress, H.R.3 was again re-introduced, although it has not yet 
been brought to the Floor for a vote.58 
 
 48.  Id. (discussing Trump administration executive orders that aspired to effect drug prices). 
 49.  Kenneth Yood, et al., Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American 
Economy: The Biden Administration Considers Drug Pricing Strategies While Keeping the “Most 
Favored Nations” Drug Reimbursement Program on the Sidelines, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW 
(Aug. 20, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/executive-order-promoting-competition-
american-economy-biden-administration. 
 50.  DeLancey, Jr., supra note 47. Again, the rule was delayed due to a lawsuit and the fate 
of the rule is in the Biden administration’s hands. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Cubanski & Neuman, supra note 28. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  See Juliette Cubanski et al., What’s the Latest on Medicare Drug Price Negotiations?, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Jul. 23, 2021), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/whats-
the-latest-on-medicare-drug-price-negotiations/ (discussing H.R. 3 and Medicare negotiation 
under the Biden administration). 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act, H.R. 3, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 57.  Cubanski & Neuman, supra note 28. 
 58.  H.R.3 - 117th Congress (2021-2022): Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act, 
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3 (last visited Nov. 11, 
2021). 
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This solution only touches a small portion of insured Americans, 
namely those covered under Medicare. In 2019, 18.1 percent of the U.S. 
population was covered under Medicare.59 On the other hand, 68.5 
percent of the U.S. population was covered by plans in the private 
health insurance market.60 An additional 19.8 percent of individuals 
were covered under Medicaid.61 Those on private health insurance and 
the uninsured also need a solution addressing drug prices. 
II.  A HISTORY OF U.S. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
The United States has a rich history of encouraging private 
litigation to support its ex ante regulation from Congress and 
agencies.62 During the New Deal era, Congress attempted to set up a 
“bureaucracy-centered enforcement regime” that gave agencies the 
primary investigatory power to find and prevent wrongdoing.63 The 
system, however, still left a lot of responsibility for ex post regulation 
to the common law tort regime.64 During the twentieth century, 
Congress intentionally gave more power to the private enforcement 
system by implementing mechanisms such as private rights of action in 
statutes.65 Many reasons have been put forth to explain this 
development, including both a pervasive doubt in the government’s 
ability to properly regulate, and cynical accusations of a lazy 
government—seeking credit for policies but shirking from the 
responsibility of monitoring the price and complexities of 
implementing said regulations.66 
Delegating the regulatory power to the courts also provides a stable 
system of interpretation and ensures staying power once those 
interpretations have been set. Courts and judges are “subject to strong 
institutional norms that render judicial interpretation more stable and 
consistent over time than interpretation by successive political 
 
 59.  RYAN J. ROSSO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10830, US HEALTH CARE COVERAGE AND 
SPENDING 1 (2021). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. It is important to note there may be possible dual enrollment overlap between 
Medicare and Medicaid.  
 62.  See Glover, supra note 16, at 1147 (“[T]he primacy of ex post private enforcement . . . is 
in large part an outgrowth of America’s inherited regulatory design, which relied largely on 
private suits brought pursuant to common law doctrines, as opposed to ex ante public regulation 
of wrongdoing by governmental bodies.”). 
 63.  Id. (quoting Sean Farhang, The Political Development of Job Discrimination Litigation, 
1963-1976, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 23, 24 (2009)). 
 64.  Id. at 1147–48. 
 65.  Id. at 1148. 
 66.  Id. at 1151–52. 
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administrations.”67 By explicitly giving courts the authority to interpret 
and implement legislation, Congress ensures the regulation will not be 
swayed or distorted by the next presidential administration. The private 
enforcement model also provides several advantages over public 
enforcement, such as ensuring an informational advantage to the party 
enforcing the right and preventing a geographically distant agency 
regulating from afar.68 
The healthcare field is unique in this broader system of private 
enforcement because Congress has explicitly provided a strict form of 
ex ante agency regulation through the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, which authorizes the FDA to regulate drugs.69 The FDA, 
however, makes clear that the goal of the ex ante regulation is to reduce 
physical harm to patients by ensuring the safety of the drugs on the 
marketplace in the United States.70 The private enforcement 
mechanisms that surround the healthcare system serve to pick up the 
slack in economic regulation, including a system to promote generic 
entry to reduce drug prices and qui tam relators to reduce healthcare 
fraud for the U.S. government. 
A.  The Hatch-Waxman Act and Generic Drug Entry 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984, known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, regulates generic drug entry 
into the marketplace by providing an easier avenue for FDA approval 
and a private enforcement mechanism to challenge patents held by 
brand name companies.71 The purpose of the Act is to “make available 
more low-cost generic drugs by establishing a generic drug approval 
process for pioneer drugs.”72 Before the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic 
 
 67.  Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and 
Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1247 
(2002). 
 68.  See Glover, supra note 16, at 1155–1158 (describing several areas of private enforcement 
where agencies are not the ideal party to enforce a right). 
 69.  21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399i (2018). 
 70.  See What We Do, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-
do#:~:text=Freedom%20of%20Information-
,FDA%20Mission,and%20products%20that%20emit%20radiation (last visited May 7, 2021) 
(“The Food and Drug Administration is responsible for protecting the public health by ensuring 
the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, and medical 
devices”). 
 71.  See Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. § 355 (2018)) (discussing the approval process for new drugs and providing for a thirty 
month stay if an action challenging the patent is brought within forty-five days). 
 72.  H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 14 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647. 
DAY_FINAL_NOTE_12.21.2021 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/2021  7:37 PM 
2021] LEVERAGING PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 61 
drug companies were required to perform independent clinical drug 
trials to earn FDA approval.73 Even though it was undeniably for 
“society’s benefit to introduce generic versions of . . . drugs . . . as quickly 
as possible,” there was no easy pathway for generic companies to get 
approval.74 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic drug manufacturers can file 
an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), which relies on the 
clinical trials conducted and data collected by a brand name drug 
manufacturer to get FDA approval.75 A key requirement is that the 
generic drug manufacturer proves the generic has the same active 
ingredient as, and is the “bioequivalence” of, the proposed product to a 
branded drug.76 The new entry mechanisms for generic manufacturers 
were balanced with greater protection for brand name drug 
manufacturers in several ways, such as a patent term extension of up to 
five years,77 up to five years of data exclusivity,78 and a thirty-month stay 
as a result of Paragraph IV litigation.79 
The Hatch-Waxman Act also invites litigation through a 
mechanism in Paragraph IV. Known as “Paragraph IV Certification,” a 
generic firm seeking market entry must confirm there are no patent 
rights preventing market entry.80 In doing so, the generic company 
certifies that any existing patents are “invalid or will not be infringed 
by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the 
application is submitted.”81 Once generic companies have made this 
certification, brand name drug companies will often sue the filer for 
patent infringement.82 The first ANDA filer also receives a 180-day 
 
 73.  Alfred Engelberg, Unaffordable Prescription Drugs: The Real Legacy of the Hatch-




 74.  Ohly & Patel, supra note 21, at 111 (quoting Hasneen Karbalai, The Hatch-Waxman 
(Im)Balancing Act, DIGITAL ACCESS TO SCHOLARSHIP AT HARVARD, 
https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/10015297 (last accessed October 8, 2021)). 
 75.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1)-(2) (2018). 
 76.  Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2018). 
 77.  35 U.S.C. § 156(c), (g)(6) (2018). 
 78.  21 U.S.C. § 355 (c)(3)(E)(ii) (2018). 
 79.  Id. § 355 (c)(3)(C) (2018). 
 80.  Id. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2018). 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  See, e.g., AstraZeneca Pharms. LP v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
26196, No. 02 Civ. 7936 (WHP), at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2005)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 467 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(discussing how the patent holder pharmaceutical company brought suit for patent infringement 
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exclusivity against other generic drug manufacturers,83 which 
encourages and invites this system of private litigation. 
Studies have shown that Paragraph IV litigation has proven 
successful in increasing generic drug market entry and decreasing 
health spending.84 Prior to the Act, because of the lengthy and 
expensive process to get generic drug approval, only 35 percent of 
drugs with an expired patent had a generic equivalent.85 In 2020, with 
the easier approval process and automatic substitution at the pharmacy 
for generics, generic drugs were 90 percent of all dispensed 
prescriptions while only accounting for 20 percent of drug spending.86 
Furthermore, generics have generated $313 billion of drug savings.87 
For consumers, the average copay for a generic drug was $6.97, and for 
the brand name drug it was $56.32.88 
Private litigation in this sphere has created two related issues that 
have captured the attention of critics: evergreening and prospecting. 
The issues are two sides of the same coin—evergreening is a practice 
that extends market exclusivity, and prospecting is a practice that 
shortens market exclusivity. Evergreening is the tendency of drug 
manufacturers to pile weak patents on top of their active ingredient 
patent in a bid to increase market exclusivity.89 On the other side, there 
is the risk of prospecting, where generic brands over-challenge drug 
patents, artificially shortening the life of the patent.90 While either side 
of the coin likes to point fingers at the other, criticizing this push and 
pull as a fundamental error in the system, the actions taken by both 
sides to have better market positions is the type of behavior 
inducement intended by Paragraph IV litigation. The public good is 
served by incentivizing companies to challenge drugs, and although 
that may lead to blockbuster drugs fielding more patent challenges, 
 
after the generic company filed an ANDA). 
 83.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2018). 
 84.  See Ohly & Patel, supra note 21, at 117 (stating an FTC study found 73% of generic drug 
manufacturers won patent litigation between 1992 and June 2002). 
 85.  Garth Boehm et al., Development of the Generic Drug Industry in the US After the 
Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, 3 ACTA PHARMACEUTICA SINICA B 297, 298 (2013). 
 86.  2020 Generic Drug & Biosimilars Access & Savings in the U.S. Report, ASSOCIATION 
FOR ACCESSIBLE MEDICINES 1, 16 (2020), https://accessiblemeds.org/sites/default/files/2020-
09/AAM-2020-Generics-Biosimilars-Access-Savings-Report-US-Web.pdf. 
 87.  Id. at 4. 
 88.  Id. at 17. 
 89.  Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 41, at 330. 
 90.  See id. at 333 (describing a study which found that the market life for drugs making more 
than $500 million is 12.7 years, whereas those drugs which make less than $50 million have a 
market life of 15.1 years). 
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those challenges serve to limit the negative effects of evergreening. The 
system preserves only the strongest patents, which are meant to protect 
valuable drugs, while the weaker fall in favor of generics. This process 
will ultimately lower drug prices. 
Another currently unraveling issue is the potential antitrust liability 
created by pay-for-delay settlements.91 Drug manufacturers are using 
the creative solution of paying a settlement to generic manufacturers 
so that they stay out of the market for a period of time.92 Because 
monopoly pricing always exceeds duopoly pricing, and the first-filer for 
ANDA applications has the exclusive right to generic challenges,93 the 
drug manufacturer has an incentive to keep the first-filer out of the 
field for a price. Pay-for-delay settlements are an example of 
unintended consequences of private enforcement, where settlements 
may lead to longer market exclusivities than without private 
enforcement.94 
B.  Qui Tam Litigation and Healthcare Industry Fraud 
The Civil False Claims Act (FCA) implements a system of qui tam 
litigation to combat fraud in payment to the government.95 The Act 
allows qui tam plaintiffs,96 known as relators, to bring a civil action for 
any violation of the FCA and receive up to twenty-five percent of the 
judgment or settlement.97 Under the FCA, relators bring civil actions 
in the name of the government.98 The statute was drafted to place the 
government in control of the prosecutions with the assistance of private 
parties.99 When an action is filed by a relator, the action remains under 
seal for sixty days while the government decides whether or not to 
 
 91.  See generally Raymond J. Prince, Pay-For-Delay: How Brand-Name and Generic 
Pharmaceutical Drug Companies Collude and Cost Consumers Billions, 68 S.C. L. REV. 689 (2017) 
(providing an overview of pay-for-delay settlements in the pharmaceutical industry). 
 92.  Id. at 693. 
 93.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2018). 
 94.  See generally Prince, supra note 91 (providing an overview of pay-for-delay settlements 
in the pharmaceutical industry). 
 95.  Christina Orsini Broderick, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical 
Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 952 (2007). 
 96.  Qui tam comes from the Latin term “qui tam pro domino rege quam se ipso in hac parte 
sequitur,” meaning “who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.” Qui tam action, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (8th ed. 2004). 
 97.  31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2018).  
 98.  Id. § 3730(b)(1) (2018). 
 99.  Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with Privatization of Public 
Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 285–86 (2007). 
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intervene.100 After the sixty days, the relator may proceed with the suit, 
either with the government as prosecutor or with the government 
actively monitoring the case.101 
FCA claims have been on the rise recently, both generally and as to 
healthcare fraud. Congress amended the FCA in 1986 to incentivize 
relators to bring claims by making it easier for a relator to recover in 
an action and making it safer to be a whistleblower as a relator.102 
Furthermore, the Deficit Reductions Act of 2005 specifically requires 
any entity making payments under State Medicaid plans to provide its 
employees with information about the FCA.103 The number of qui tam 
suits has risen dramatically since the amendment, from 32 suits in 1987, 
to 533 in 1997,104 to 672 in 2020.105 
The majority of recent FCA litigation has targeted the 
pharmaceutical industry.106 In 2020, of the $2.2 billion recovered 
through the FCA, $1.8 billion involved healthcare industry fraud.107 
Overall, $1.6 billion was recovered specifically through qui tam suits.108 
In the healthcare industry, FCA claims help to prevent money from 
fraudulently flowing to private pharmaceutical companies.109 These 
claims also effectively lower pharmaceutical drug prices by stopping 
companies from illegally subsidizing co-pays to support their high drug 
prices.110 Furthermore, kickback schemes and fraudulent payments can 
 
 100.  Id. at 286. 
 101.  Id. at 286–87. 
 102.  See Broderick, supra note 95, at 954 (stating that the amendment allowed private parties 
the right to continue as a party even after government intervention, increased the relator’s 
recovery, and protected relators from retaliatory actions). 
 103.  Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(68)(A) (2018)). The Act also put into place incentives for states to pass false claims 
acts similar to the FCA by allowing states 10 percent of any recovery under those laws. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396h(a). Currently, 21 states have approved laws under this statute. See State False Claims Act 
Reviews, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GENERAL, https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/state-false-claims-act-reviews/ (last visited May 7, 2021) 
(listing approved state laws). 
 104.  Broderick, supra note 95, at 955. 
 105.  Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department 
Recovers Over $2.2 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2020 (Jan. 14, 2021), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-22-billion-false-claims-act-
cases-fiscal-year-2020. 
 106.  See id. (stating that $1.8 billion of the $2.2 billion recovered in Fiscal Year 2020 under 
the FCA involved the healthcare industry). 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  See id. (describing a settlement with Novartis for $591 million to resolve claims relating 
to kickbacks to induce prescriptions for Novartis drugs). 
 110.  Id. (detailing two settlements with Novartis and Gilead which paid over $148 million to 
resolve claims that they paid co-pays for the companies’ own drugs through supposedly 
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lead to potentially poorer health outcomes by interfering with the 
independent decision-making of healthcare professionals.111 Overall, 
qui tam litigation in the pharmaceutical industry serves to regulate ex 
post by uncovering behavior that, without private relators, might never 
come to light. 
Qui tam litigation is especially important when it regulates 
industries with asymmetric information between the regulator and the 
regulated party, such as in Medicare payment fraud.112 The aim of the 
enforcement mechanism is to find the party with the most accurate 
information at the lowest possible cost to the public, and hopefully 
deter fraudulent behavior by increasing the likelihood of 
punishment.113 In order to operate efficiently and with the lowest cost 
to the public, the system should be designed to bring forward only the 
highest quality suits. Yet, in practice that has not happened.114 
When the government participates in a qui tam action, the parties 
will likely receive a larger recovery than without government 
intervention, leading to potential over-utilization of the qui tam 
system.115 Despite the high number of frivolous qui tam lawsuits, the 
government still recovers a significant amount of money, meaning the 
qui tam provision still holds value as a way to find fraudulent activity.116 
The number of government-initiated actions, however, has decreased 
at the same rate qui tam suits have increased—suggesting a loss to the 
public in the cost of having to investigate qui tam suits as private parties 
when the government may have the capability of investigating these 
actions on its own.117 
Qui tam litigation also creates the issue of moral hazard by allowing 
the government to benefit from private enforcement while letting 
private relators shoulder the risk. The availability of private enforcers 
 
independent foundations). 
 111.  Id. (describing schemes which induced the purchase of good and services). 
 112.  Anthony Casey & Anthony Niblett, Noise Reduction: The Screening Value of Qui Tam, 
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1178 (2014). 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  See id. at 1186 (stating that “increasing the rewards for informing or decreasing the 
private cost of informing . . . dilutes the quality of the information brought forward”). 
 115.  See Matthew, supra note 99, at 293 (finding that several FCA cases recently prosecuted 
cost taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars, but were only questionably supported by the facts 
of the case). 
 116.  See Broderick, supra note 95, at 955 (finding the government had recovered $8.4 billion 
from qui tam lawsuits over a period of less than twenty years). 
 117.  Id. at 979. 
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raises a significant risk of over-enforcement of the statute.118 Instead of 
pursuing only the best and most reliable cases of fraud, the government 
passively awaits case outcomes while private litigants bear the costs of 
litigation.119 This leads to an increased number of lower quality lawsuits, 
creating a schism between the original intent of the FCA and the 
operation of the statute in reality.120 Therefore, although qui tam suits 
may correct information imbalances when uncovering fraudulent 
practices—especially in the healthcare industry—the field also suffers 
from over-litigation and frivolous suits. 
C. Private Antitrust and Potential Pharmaceutical Litigation 
Federal antitrust law prohibits anticompetitive behavior under the 
Sherman Act,121 inviting both private and public enforcement in court. 
The Sherman Act Section 1 prohibits price fixing and collective 
anticompetitive behavior.122 The Sherman Act Section 2 prohibits 
monopolies and conspiracies to monopolize, as well as mergers that 
have the risk of creating a monopoly.123 Enforcement power for these 
sections lies with the United States government,124 state attorneys 
general,125 and private parties who have been “injured in their business” 
by behavior forbidden in the Sherman Act,126 affectionately known as 
“private attorneys general.”127 Relatedly, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) can also enforce antitrust behavior under the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits similar antitrust 
behavior as the Sherman Act.128 
The Sherman Act incentivizes private enforcement by authorizing 
treble damages for private lawsuits.129 Legislative history suggests the 
 
 118.  Matthew, supra note 99, at 282. 
 119.  Id. at 297-98. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
 122.  See id. (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby 
declared to be illegal.”). 
 123.  15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
 124.  Id. § 15f. 
 125.  Id. § 15c. 
 126.  Id. § 15. 
 127.  Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972). 
 128.  See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful”); see also 
Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Methods of Competition” in Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227 (1980). 
 129.  See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2018) (authorizing treble damages). 
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Act was meant to compensate injured victims and prevent money from 
flowing to firms with market power.130 In that way, treble damages are 
meant as both an incentive for private parties and punitive damages for 
trusts as a way to deter future anticompetitive behavior.131 Whatever 
the motivation for treble damages, private enforcement is more 
successful in deterring anticompetitive behavior than the suits brought 
by the government.132 
Antitrust enforcement specifically plays a critical role in regulating 
pharmaceutical firms’ behavior in the healthcare industry.133 Two 
potential avenues for future litigation regulating antitrust and 
pharmaceutical companies are “product hopping”134 and pay-for-delay 
settlements.135 Both have potential to increase drug prices and delay 
generic entry and competition in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Therefore, these practices are a future target for increased regulation 
aimed at creating a more efficient healthcare industry. 
Although it is unclear whether product hopping is a future avenue 
for antitrust litigation, one exemplar case in the field precipitated by 
private parties is Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Public 
Limited Co.136 There, Mylan Pharmaceuticals sued Warner Chilcott and 
Mayne Pharma under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for unlawful 
monopoly activity related to Warner Chilcott’s actions with its drug, 
Doryx.137 Warner Chilcott took a series of steps, known as “product 
hopping,” to prevent generic drug substitution for Doryx by switching 
 
 130.  Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 33 
ANTITRUST BULL. 429, 449 (1988) (noting that many statements were made by legislators which 
positioned the Act as a way to stop the “robbery” of overcharges by antitrust firms, stating trusts 
“extorted wealth” and have “stolen untold millions from the people”).  
 131.  See Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: 
An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. Rev. 879, 883 (2008) (stating private enforcement treble 
damages serve as a deterrent, but also may reflect “unawarded prejudgment interest, . . . difficult-
to-quantify unawarded damages items such as the allocative inefficiency effects of market power 
and the value of plaintiffs’ time expended pursuing litigation”). 
 132.  See id. at 905 (finding the forty private antitrust cases studied deterred anticompetitive 
behavior more than any criminal fines or sentences imposed by the DOJ). 
 133.  For an overview of the areas of antitrust enforcement related to pharmaceuticals, see 
Michael A. Carrier, Antitrust in the Pharmaceutical Sector: An Overview of US Case Law, 
ANTITRUST CASE LAWS E-BULLETIN, Oct. 8, 2018, 
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/sinha/files/ssrn-id3269506.pdf (last visited May 7, 2021). 
 134.  See generally Jessie Cheng, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471 (2008) (describing the practice of product 
hopping in the pharmaceutical industry). 
 135.  See generally Prince, supra note 91 (providing an overview of pay-for-delay settlements 
in the pharmaceutical industry). 
 136.  838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 137.  Id. at 426. 
DAY_FINAL_NOTE_12.21.2021 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/2021  7:37 PM 
68 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 17 
the drug from a capsule version to a tablet version.138 In doing so, 
Warner Chilcott blocked its potential generic competitors from being 
able to automatically substitute their already approved capsule drugs 
with the new Doryx tablet formulation.139 The FTC filed an amicus 
brief for the case in both the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals urging the 
court to recognize antitrust liability for product hopping because of 
harm to generic competition.140 
The Third Circuit was unconvinced by the arguments for 
anticompetitive behavior, holding the generic company still had other 
available actions in the market they could have taken, such as 
developing a tablet version before Doryx took the tablet off the 
market.141 Furthermore, the court found that Warner Chilcott had 
reasons other than pure anticompetitive behavior for the product 
changes, including harmonization with European drug dosages.142 
Though, here, the private enforcement failed to successfully enforce 
antitrust laws for product hopping, the mechanism of private 
enforcement can still lead to effective and targeted regulation for 
pharmaceutical companies. 
III. THE BAYH-DOLE ACT 
Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 under Pub. L. 96-517, 
Amendments to the Patent and Trademark Act to encourage 
technological innovation.143 The Act allows a contractor to obtain a 
patent developed with federal government support, which was 
intended to incentivize private actors to commercialize federal R&D.144 
By providing patent protection to private parties that develop and 
commercialize products funded by federal money, the Bayh-Dole Act 
both encourages innovations and promotes the public good by 
 
 138.  Id. at 429. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  See generally Brief for Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission Supporting Plaintiff-
Appellant, Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421 (E.D. Pa. 2015) 
(No. 15-2236) (urging the court to recognize product hopping in the pharmaceutical industry as a 
source for antitrust liability). 
 141.  Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 838 F.3d at 438. 
 142.  Id. at 439. 
 143.  35 U.S.C. § 200 (2018) (“It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent 
system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or 
development [and] to encourage maximum participation of small business firms in federally 
supported research and development efforts.”). 
 144.  Abigail Amato Rives, Reorienting Bayh-Dole’s March-In: Looking to Purpose and 
Objectives in the Public’s Interest, 5 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 77, 85 (2013). 
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increasing access to new inventions.145 In return, the government retains 
a “nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license” for the 
government’s own benefits,146 as well as “march-in rights” for federal 
agencies.147 The march-in rights allow the government under certain 
circumstances to force the private parties that own the patents granted 
under the Act to grant a “nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or exclusive 
license” to a “responsible applicant or applicants.”148 
These march-in rights have never been exercised, despite six 
petitions that have been submitted to the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH).149 The differing opinions regarding the potential effect of 
exercising march-in rights on the patent system has proven to be an 
issue. Some believe march-in rights have the potential to stifle 
innovation by discouraging investment in government-funded R&D.150 
Others, however, believe the government should be able to protect 
taxpayers from excessive pricing on products that have been developed 
using public funding.151 
The uncertainty of the statutory language and the pertinent 
regulations for march-in rights is another issue. The Secretary of 
Commerce delegated the authority to promulgate implementing 
regulations of the Bayh-Dole Act to the Director of National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST), a primarily nonregulatory 
body.152 The regulations that control the exercise of march-in rights only 
require a fact-finding process and consideration of the policy and 
objective of the Bayh-Dole Act.153 The policy and objective of the Act 
are written with broad strokes, but the most relevant section is likely 
the phrase “protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of 
inventions.”154 Without clear regulations, however, businesses that 
 
 145.  See Stephen Ezell, The Bayh-Dole Act’s Vital Importance to the U.S. Life-Sciences 
Innovation System, ITIF: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION FOUNDATION (Mar. 
4, 2019) https://itif.org/publications/2019/03/04/bayh-dole-acts-vital-importance-us-life-sciences-
innovation-system (explaining the significant role the Bayh-Dole Act plays in encouraging 
commercialization and utilization of inventions). 
 146.  35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2018). 
 147.  Id. § 203(a). 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44597, MARCH-IN RIGHTS UNDER THE 
BAYH-DOLE ACT 8 (2016). 
 150.  Id. at 13. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Rights to Federally Funded Inventions and Licensing of Government Owned 
Inventions, 86 Fed. Reg. 35 (proposed Dec. 31, 2020) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 401 and 404). 
 153.  37 C.F.R. § 401.6(g). 
 154.  35 U.S.C. § 200 (2018). 
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acquire patents eligible for march-in rights have expressed their 
worries and reticence over the potential use of march-in rights in the 
future.155 
Finally, courts have refused to read a private right of action into the 
Bayh-Dole Act,156 precluding any possible private enforcement 
mechanisms for the Act. Because there is no explicit private right of 
action, courts turned to legislative history—determining that the Act 
primarily regulates the relationship between the government and 
researchers and not private parties.157 Therefore, in the future, private 
parties will be unable to use the Bayh-Dole Act in other private 
litigation unless the statute is amended. 
IV. AMENDING THE BAYH-DOLE ACT FOR PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
Congress should amend the Act to include an invitation for private 
parties to enter the market and sue drug companies with 
unconscionable pricing, in return receiving a license to manufacture 
that drug at lower costs (the “Amendment”). This policy change would 
lead to lower drug prices and solve the issues with march-in rights 
inherent in the Bayh-Dole Act. By leaving the enforcement of the 
march-in rights to the courts, Congress can avoid the need to regulate 
each drug on the market and ensure stable interpretation of the Act 
down the line. In the future, a manufacturer that enters the market with 
a new brand name drug will have clear, enforceable precedent to create 
a price ceiling to influence their pricing decisions. Although the Act 
would invite increased litigation for drug manufacturers, potentially 
leading to over-utilization of the courts, the number of suits can be 
controlled through a first actor provision in the Amendment and the 
inherent power of the court to punish private parties who pursue 
frivolous suits. 
First, Congress should amend the march-in rights provision of the 
 
 155.  See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., SPECIAL PUB. NO. 
1234, RETURN ON INVESTMENT INITIATIVE TO ADVANCE THE PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT 
AGENDA: FINAL GREEN PAPER 32 (2019), 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.1234.pdf (finding stakeholders 
believe the existing regulation is unclear regarding the federal government’s march-in rights, 
leading to market uncertainty). 
 156.  Madey v. Duke Univ., 413 F.Supp. 2d 601, 613 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (“[T]he Bayh-Dole Act 
is designed to regulate the relationship between the Government and its funding recipients, but 
it would not be available to a private third party as the basis for a private right of action or private 
defense.”). 
 157.  Id.  
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Bayh-Dole Act to include more specific definitions and situations 
where those rights should be exercised in private litigation, as well as 
restrict the use of the march-in rights only to those drug companies with 
unconscionable pricing. Congress should define what factors the court 
should consider for a reasonableness analysis when determining 
whether a specific drug company’s prices are unconscionable. When 
setting out these factors, Congress should use a variety of mechanisms 
to center drug pricing analysis around value to human life, and 
especially for the march-in rights, the amount of public funding each 
drug received during R&D. 
One potential reasonableness measure would be to use the 
European drug pricing control of assessing the added value of a new 
drug compared with what is on the market to set a maximum price for 
the new drug.158 A way to visualize this is through the Quality Added 
Life Years (QALY) measure. By equating the additional QALYs each 
drug creates above the previously available treatment, Congress can 
create a guidepost for the courts to visualize how expensive a drug 
should be relative to its benefit to consumers. A related consideration 
would be the drug’s importance in treatment regimes or supply chains. 
For example, insulin must be affordable not only because it saves lives, 
but because its users need multiple doses per day. 
One important limiting factor to the Amendment’s finding of 
unconscionable drug pricing would be the inclusion of a statutory 
factor that requires the court to weigh the amount of public funding 
that was received for the creation of the patent. The Bayh-Dole Act 
arguably over-captures those patents that are eligible for march-in 
rights by declaring any patent that received any amount of public 
funding may potentially be invaded.159 The purpose behind the 
Amendment, however, is to recoup the investment the public has made 
in these drug patents through taxpayer money—not to unduly punish 
companies for competitive behavior. Therefore, the Amendment would 
require a court’s reasonableness analysis to account for the amount of 
public funding received for a specific patent. A drug manufacturer that 
received nominal public funding during a drug’s development would 
 
 158.  Marc A. Rodwin, What Can the United States Learn from Pharmaceutical Spending 
Controls in France?, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Nov. 11, 2019), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2019/nov/what-can-united-states-
learn-drug-spending-controls-france. 
 159.  See 35 U.S.C. § 203 (defining the rights under the Bayh-Dole Act which allows nonprofit 
organizations or small businesses to keep title to inventions when under a federal funding 
agreement). 
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have a stronger case to keep their drug prices high. 
Notably, the Amendment would not regulate the field of all drugs, 
but instead only target those drugs where the public has already 
contributed to the drug’s R&D and so should benefit from its use on 
the market. By tying reasonableness of pricing to the amount of federal 
R&D money received, it would not encourage the government to 
become a regulator in the free marketplace of pharmaceutical goods. 
Rather, the Amendment would encourage private competitors to act 
on behalf of the government to recoup sunk costs for research, without 
double paying for both research and receipt of the final product. 
The Amendment to the Act would also include a qui tam provision 
similar to the FCA’s to invite private parties—more specifically 
qualified competitor pharmaceutical companies with the 
manufacturing capabilities to take on the march-in license—to sue on 
behalf of the government. Unlike the FCA, which gives private parties 
a fixed amount of the recovery in a qui tam suit,160 the litigant 
pharmaceutical company here would only be rewarded a license for the 
overpriced drug for a limited period of time,161 with renewal dependent 
on the original pharmaceutical company’s revised pricing after the 
duopoly period. The Amendment would also include a first actor 
provision similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act, under which only the first 
qualified pharmaceutical competitor could sue within a set period, 
limiting the potential amount of litigation in the future. 
The Amendment would also implement the solutions found to fix 
the moral hazard issue in qui tam litigation by requiring the 
government to approve any litigation, and further, to pre-screen 
relators to ensure they have the manufacturing capabilities necessary 
to properly compete in the field with the primary manufacturer. By 
requiring this approval from the government, the Amendment would 
ensure there will not be frivolous and time-wasting litigation. 
Therefore, although a company’s drug pricing may be unconscionably 
high, the Amendment would be designed to only challenge those drugs 
that have a competitive manufacturer, thus decreasing the number of 
drugs that can be challenged at one time while limiting the number of 
frivolous and harassing lawsuits that could potentially be invited. 
 
 160.  31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2018). 
 161.  It is beyond the scope of this Note to determine the ideal period of time for the 
temporary license, however, the period of time should be enough to motivate the pharmaceutical 
companies to litigate for the right to manufacture the drug. 
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By empowering qui tam relators, the Amendment would ensure the 
parties with the informational advantage, in this case a competitor in 
the direct economic market, can participate in the litigation. Courts 
generally do not have the institutional competence to make decisions 
regarding complex pricing schemes such as drug pricing, lacking the 
career economists who are often at the whim of Congress. Yet, through 
qui tam litigation which would require a competitor in the field as the 
relator, the Amendment ensures the parties in court will bring their 
best arguments relating to the factors in the Amendment. Therefore, 
the parties themselves will be incentivized to bring economists or 
health experts before the court to convince the court of the 
reasonableness, or unreasonableness, of the drug pricing—thus curing 
some of the institutional limits of the court. 
Another added benefit of the Amendment is that it would serve as 
a potential case study to fix the uneven bargaining power in the 
healthcare industry. Only actors with high bargaining power in an 
economy can influence prices, meaning average U.S. citizens have no 
bargaining power to influence drug prices. Theoretically, Medicare is 
the health body with the most bargaining power in the United States 
due to the sheer volume of payments related to Medicare patients.162 
Although the government may soon give Medicare the ability to 
negotiate directly for drug prices, the negotiation process would only 
protect those patients covered by Medicare.163 By providing an avenue 
for private enforcement that would regulate drug prices for all buyers 
in the healthcare marketplace, the Amendment’s litigation would 
artificially level the current imbalance in bargaining power in the 
healthcare industry, thus effectively regulating the cost of drugs broadly 
throughout the market. 
Inviting ex post regulation of drug prices in the court means the 
application of the Amendment will not be subject to the whims of 
political parties as different actors rotate through federal agencies. By 
delineating specific statutory factors and inviting litigation, the 
Amendment would ensure stable and relatively uniform interpretation 
of whether a given drug price is unconscionable. Although a drug 
company could be open to new litigation avenues, the manufacturers 
 
 162.  See Prescription Drug Prices: Harnessing Medicare’s Purchasing Power, THE CENTER 
FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Jan. 28, 2004), https://americanprogress.org/article/prescription-
drug-prices-harnessing-medicares-purchasing-power/ (discussing Medicare’s purchasing power). 
 163.  See Cubanski et al., supra note 54 (discussing H.R. 3 and Medicare negotiation under 
the Biden administration). 
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could also rely on the stable interpretations. In doing so, companies 
could alter their competitive behavior in the marketplace, and any 
inefficiencies caused by the litigation could be mitigated in the future 
by encouraging companies to lower drug prices to avoid litigation 
altogether. 
At some point, the cost of a competitor challenging an 
unconscionable drug price will be higher than any duopoly pricing they 
may gain through a license. Manufacturing and distribution are 
expensive endeavors for drug companies, and a rational company 
would only seek a license when the potential profits make up the loss. 
If a rational drug manufacturer, however, were to rely on the courts’ 
interpretation of the Amendment and accordingly price their drug at 
or below the estimated unconscionable threshold, the risk of losing the 
lawsuit would be too high for a rival manufacturer to want to litigate. 
For the FCA, this would be seen as a failure of the private enforcement 
mechanism to adequately bring forward informed parties. But here, the 
decline in the number of lawsuits could be attributed to the decrease in 
drug prices, and the successful implementation of the Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States healthcare industry has sky-rocketing drug 
prices, and although there are many private enforcement mechanisms 
surrounding the industry that regulate ex post as to fraud, 
anticompetitive activity, and generic entry, no private enforcement 
mechanism directly encourages private parties to litigate to lower drug 
prices. Private enforcement mechanisms do not always function 
properly—with risks of over-utilization and potential illegal 
anticompetitive behavior as firms attempt to avoid private 
enforcement. Nevertheless, private enforcement mechanisms generally 
have been successful in both incentivizing private parties to regulate 
industries ex post as well as making regulation easier than it would be 
with only agency action. 
Congress has already expressed intent to design mechanisms which 
regulate patents created with public funding by building march-in 
rights into the Bayh-Dole Act. Drug patents created with public 
funding should be subject to a higher standard of regulation than drug 
patents created without public funding to protect U.S. citizens from 
double paying for both the development of and access to the drug. 
Passing an Amendment to the Bayh-Dole Act that clearly defines when 
march-in rights would be exercised and inviting private manufacturers 
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to sue for the right to get a manufacturing license would create a system 
of ex post regulation for drug prices without stifling innovation or 
creating an unpredictable regulatory regime. Courts are experienced in 
implementing reasonableness analyses, and with specified factors from 
Congress, manufacturers could rely on a relatively stable form of 
regulation and alter their economic behavior accordingly. 
Overall, this solution is a moderate proposal that would affect the 
behavior of a modest number of drug manufacturers. The Amendment, 
however, would be a step forward to encourage tighter regulation of 
drug prices and hopefully provide a model for other proposals down 
the line. Although the Amendment is specifically tied to the Bayh-Dole 
Act to temper the risks of over-utilization, a more expansive private 
enforcement mechanism that affects all drug companies could be 
implemented in the future. Regulating drug prices to reduce market 
inefficiencies in the healthcare industry will lead to more lives saved. 
 
